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A FRESH LOOK AT AGENCY "DISCRETION" 
JOHN M. ROGERS* 
INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers who represent or litigate against government agen-
cies must wrestle so frequently with the concept of agency "dis-
cretion" that they may be forgiven for believing that the term is 
devoid of intrinsic meaning-a chameleon deriving substance 
only from its particular context. For instance, mandamus will lie 
only for ministerial acts, as opposed to "discretionary" ones. 
Agency acts that are "by law committed to agency discretion" 
are not reviewable in court under the federal Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).l However, agency actions are reviewed for 
"abuse of discretion." On the other hand, tort suits against the 
government will not be allowed for exercises of "discretionary 
functions," and individual government officials may be abso-
lutely immune from tort suits only for exercises of "discretion-
ary" duties. Because courts making these determinations do not 
always use the same criteria, it is easy to conclude that there is 
no consistent definition of "discretion" that will contribute to 
sound analysis in each context. Such a definitional analysis is 
suggested here. The approach will be inductive-to set forth an 
analysis and then to see if it works satisfactorily. The test will 
be whether the definitions comport with sound case law while 
furthering the policy reasons for the use of the concept of discre-
tion in each particular context. 
An agency constantly has to make choices. It has to choose, 
for example, whether to prosecute someone, whether to grant a 
license, which of several persons to hire, and which of several 
possible standards of conduct to adopt. The agency generally 
will be limited by "the law"2 in what choices it can make; it also 
may be limited in the bases it may use for making those choices. 
* Associate Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A. 1970, Stanford 
University; J.D. 1974, University of Michigan. 
1. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1976) [hereinafter qited as APA]. 
2. The law here means the Constitution, valid statutes, valid regulations, and ap-
plicable common law. 
776 
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The law may be said to give an agency discretion when 
under clear facts the agency may make more than one choice. If, 
however, on undisputed facts the law permits only one choice, 
then the agency is said to have no discretion.3 For example, if an 
agency is permitted by law to hire citizens between the ages of 
eighteen and forty, it has great discretion-there are many pos-
sible choices. But, if an agency must grant a certain type of li-
cense to every applicant who pays ten dollars, is over eighteen, 
and has better than 20/40 vision, then in the absence of dispute 
over payment, age, or vision, the agency has no discretion: the 
law requires it to give the license. 
An agency "exceeds" its discretion when it makes a choice 
outside the range of possibilities permitted by law. For instance, 
in the hiring example, an agency exceeds its discretion by hiring 
a noncitizen or a seventeen-year-old person. 
An agency "abuses" its discretion when it makes a choice 
within the range of permissible possibilities, but for a reason or 
on a basis that is not allowed by the law. Typical bases for deci-
sionmaking that the law might not allow are the applicant's race, 
the decisionmaker's malice, casting of lots, or receipt of kick-
backs. In the example, a twenty-year-old citizen would be a le-
gally permissible choice, but if the choice were made on the ba-
sis of bribery, the agency would have abused its discretion 
because this basis is not permitted by the law. 
Although abuse of discretion is undesirable, in one sense it 
is not as bad as exceeding discretion. The choice made is permis-
sible under the law. That is, if the agency had arrived at the 
same choice for a legitimate reason, the law-givers would have 
been satisfied. 
Agency action is "committed" to agency discretion when the 
law does not limit the agency's bases for decisionmaking. For 
instance, if the law permits the Army to assign a private to a 
particular post for any reason whatsoever, then the decision is 
committed to Army discretion. 
3. See K. Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 4 (1969) [hereinafter 
cited as Davis, Discretionary Justice]; Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 Harv. 
L. Rev. 239, 247-49 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe, Judicial Review]. Professor Davis' 
book deals primarily with the greater policy questions of when and how much discretion 
should be allowed under the law. 
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Finally, particular types of agency "functions" may be de-
scribed as "discretionary" because the activity consists largely of 
selecting among permissible choices, rather than of determining 
which is a required choice. Thus lower level officials, whose du-
ties largely involve following detailed regulations, do not exercise 
a "discretionary function" as frequently as higher level policy-
making officials who are engaged in determining what substan-
tive regulations will be promulgated; the latter are primarily en-
gaged in selecting among permissible choices. Because virtually 
all agency functions involve some choice making, these func-
tions, unlike particular choices, cannot be classified in an either-
or fashion as "discretionary" or "nondiscretionary." Thus, the 
determination of whether functions or duties in general are 
"discretionary" must be given substance by the particular poli-
cies underlying the legal rule using the term. 
All of this fits together reasonably well in the absence of 
factual disputes. There is, however, no logical reason why the 
existence of factual disputes should disturb concepts of agency 
discretion. Although it may be unknown whether the person 
hired is seventeen or nineteen or whether the basis for hiring 
was a bribe, there are established fact-finding procedures to 
make such a determination and standards for reviewing findings 
of fact. 4 Because theoretically there can be only one factual 
truth, exercising discretion is analytically distinct from the as-
certainment of facts. There is no choice in a factual matter, but 
rather only the difficulty in determining what is the single an-
swer because of conflicting or insufficient information.5 
4. Some examples are de novo review and deference to the agency's factual 
determination. 
5. Professor Davis suggests that the "full reality about discretion is somewhat more 
complex" in part because "discretion" may "include the judgment that goes into finding 
facts from conflicting evidence." Davis, Discretionary Justice, supra note 3, at 4-5. Al-
though true, the point is consistent with the posited definition. If, in determining facts, 
the law because of limited or conflicting evidence permits an agency to choose which of 
several versions is true, an agency may be said to have discretion in determining facts. 
This is merely using "discretion" at a different level of analysis. If an agency has some 
choice in determining facts (or in determining law), it only has that choice in the pres-
ence of certain antecedent facts (and law). The antecedent (a) facts and (b) law in Pro-
fessor Davis' example would be (a) the evidence presented and (b) the law of evidence 
and judicial review. Let us say that under the judicial review law of a jurisdiction (ante-
cedent law), in the presence of conflicting expert testimony (antecedent facts), an agency 
may choose which facts to find within certain bounds. The deferential standard of review 
is in effect a grant of discretion in the finding of primary facts. In the presence of the 
primary facts it must be determined whether the primary law (the substantive law) gives 
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Similarly, there may be disputes over what the governing 
law provides. Disputes could arise regarding whether the law re-
quired an applicant to be twenty-one rather than eighteen, or 
whether holding a lottery is a proper legal basis for choice. 
Again, there are established means for making such determina-
tions, such as legislative history or canons of construction. Al-
though these methods may include deference to an agency's in-
terpretation of the law, they are still consistent with the 
underlying theoretical axiom that there is ultimately only one 
proper interpretation of the law. Accordingly, discretion is ana-
lytically distinct from the ascertainment of governing law6 be-
cause the latter theoretically involves no choice. 
Determinations of so-called "mixed" questions of law and 
fact,7 such as whether the applicant is a "citizen" within the 
meaning of the governing law, are also distinct from the exercise 
of discretion. Although the appropriate standard for determin-
ing a mixed fact-law issue may be elusive,6 the existence of only 
one factual truth and the existence of only one proper interpre-
the agency more than one choice. The exercise of choice in the fact finding process 
should not be confused with the exercise of choice once the facts are found. 
The idea of agency choice of facts in the presence of insufficient or conflicting evi-
dence may explain the use in some cases of an "abuse of discretion" scope of review for 
fact finding, where the substantial evidence standard is not appropriate. See, e.g., APA, 
supra note 1, § 706(2)(A}. 
6. The law discussed here is the law limiting the agency's choice or the bases for its 
choice. Situations where the agency is the law-giver itself, as when it promulgates regula-
tions, should be distinguished. Of course, an agency typically has discretion in determin-
ing which regulations to promulgate, and such regulations typically have the "force of 
law." 
7. If it is uncertain whether a statutory term applies to a particular situation, oc-
currence, or item, one can argue the presence of a question of law, because a precise 
interpretation of the term-using, for instance, legislative history-would answer the 
question. One might also argue the presence of a fact question, because a careful exami-
nation of the situation, occurrence, or item-using, for instance, expert witnesses-could 
also answer the question. This is a classic "mixed law and fact" situation. E.g., NLRB v. 
Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (whether faculty members at Yeshiva University were 
"managerial employees" under the statute). Ct. Jaffe, Judicial Review, supra note 3, at 
242-47 (contending that the application of a statue in a given case is "not fact finding 
but law making" and hence is an inherently judicial function). 
8. Compare NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 691 (administrative decision by 
the NLRB that Yeshiva University professors are not managerial employees under the 
NLRA overturned because decision, which involved "questions of law and fact," was not 
"rationally based on articulated facts and consistent with the Act"), with O'Leary v. 
Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 508 (1951) (adminstrative finding that govern-
ment employee's death occurred during course of employment upheld because the find-
ing was not "unsupported by substantial evidence"). 
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tation of the law require the conclusion that there is ultimately 
only one correct resolution of the mixed fact-law issue. Again, no 
choice is involved: the applicant either is a citizen or he is not. 
The concept of discretion as defined here must be tested to 
determine whether it satisfactorily explains and reconciles the 
use of the term in the contexts in which it most frequently 
arises. 
MANDAMUS 
Since the early 1700s, mandamus to review agency action or 
inaction has been held to lie only to require ministerial, not dis-
cretionary, acts.9 The distinction has been roundly criticized as 
"undesirable, unworkable, and without practical justification."lo 
Much of the difficulty, however, may be resolved by carefully 
distinguishing between abusing discretion and exceeding 
discretion. 
If discretion is abused, in the sense that a permissible choice 
is made for impermissible reasons, the action may nonetheless 
be deemed discretionary. If discretion is exceeded, in the sense 
that a legally impermissible choice is made, then the action that 
is required by law is nondiscretionary, or in this context, "minis-
terial."l1 Failure to make this distinction makes the cases hard . 
to reconcile. A law journal survey quoted by a popular casebook 
states that federal courts 
have adopted two approaches . . . . Under the first approach, 
the court makes the traditional determination of whether the 
alleged duty is ministerial or discretionary. If the duty is deter-
mined to be ministerial in nature, mandamus will issue. How-
ever, if the administrative action sought to be compelled is 
found to be discretionary, the court will find itself lacking 
9. See Work v. United States ex rei. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177 (1925); Decatur v. 
Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative 
Action 180-81 (1965); Jaffe & Henderson, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law: Histori-
cal Origins, 72 Law Q.R. 345, 360 (1956). 
10. K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 23.11, at 356 (1958) (footnote omit-
ted); L. Jaffe, supra note 9, at 181 ("unsound and unworkable"). 
11. Although the requirement to choose among permitted options is "ministerial," 
the choice among those options may remain "discretionary." For instance, if the law 
requires an agency to appoint a lawyer as an ombudsman, the agency has a ministerial 
duty to select a lawyer (as opposed to selecting no one, or selecting a layman); but the 
choice may be "discretionary" in that the agency may pick any lawyer. 
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